

For the Sake of ‘Peace and Security’?

The Role of Security in the European Union Enlargement Eastwards

ATSUKO HIGASHINO

ABSTRACT

The need to achieve stability and security in Europe has been a core motivation for European Union actors in their decision in favour of enlargement, calling for new measures to advance the enlargement process. EU leaders have often justified changes to the existing enlargement strategy by making reference to threats to security in Europe and by claiming that eastern enlargement could be the way to attain peace and security in Europe. Never has EU enlargement been so frequently connected with security debates. The overall effect of security concerns on the enlargement process, however, has not been adequately analysed in previous studies of EU enlargement; enlargement policy has largely been explained from economic and commercial viewpoints. This article explores the role of security concerns in EU enlargement — ‘security’ that does not necessarily come in the military form, but in what I refer to as a ‘speech act’, drawing on insights from the Copenhagen School of security studies. The article comprises (1) a conceptual framework to consider how ‘security’ as ‘speech act’ (or the ‘securitization’ approach) can explain the enlargement process, (2) three case studies of security influences in the context of EU enlargement, and (3) conclusions on when and how security has mattered in the EU enlargement process.

Keywords: Copenhagen School; enlargement; European Union; foreign policy; international relations theory; securitization approach; security

In the process of European Union enlargement eastwards, the discourse on security has greatly mattered to the nature of decisions taken.¹ Security has been referred to almost consistently and with increasing frequency throughout the period ‘from Copenhagen to Copenhagen’, from the time that the EU decided to open itself to its neighbours in Eastern Europe in June 1993 to the time when it formally concluded the accession negotiations with 10 candidate countries in December 2002. The ‘European peace and security’ argument has been constructed and established as one of the most important overarching rationales of EU enlargement eastwards: that is, decisive measures and policy instruments for eastern enlargement have been called for in the name of European peace and security.



Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association
Vol. 39(4): 347–368. Copyright ©2004 NISA www.ps.au.dk/NISA
Sage Publications www.sagepublications.com
0010-8367. DOI: 10.1177/0010836704047579

Such statements are everywhere. For example, in the Presidency Conclusions of the Helsinki European Council in December 1999, enlargement was portrayed as a means to 'lend a positive contribution to security and stability on the European continent' (European Council, 1999). The purpose of enlargement, Romano Prodi says, is 'to create a Europe in which all the peoples of this continent can live together in peace, security, freedom, justice and equality' (1999). Without it, for Tony Blair, 'Western Europe will always be faced with the threat of instability, conflict and mass migration on its borders ... Should that happen, we would all lose' (2000). The relationship between enlargement and security concerns is therefore a key to understanding the enlargement process. The issue of how security concerns have emerged in the debate on enlargement among EU leaders, and how these concerns have shaped each decision on enlargement, needs to be further explored if we are to follow the logic, rationales and rhetoric of creating a new European order. However, despite such rhetoric, much of the existing literature on EU enlargement has not fully discussed this connection between security and enlargement. In essence, the literature on EU enlargement has shed light on the economic aspects of it, while the literature on European security has not seriously considered the connection with EU enlargement.²

This article analyses discourses which link security and EU enlargement and explores how security arguments have become part of the successful strategy to justify enlargement. The first section introduces theoretical debates concerning the concept of security. The main argument is that 'security' in the context of EU enlargement does not necessarily come in a military form, but in the form of a 'speech act', drawing on insights by the Copenhagen School (CS) of security studies. The second section explains how this approach relates to the analysis of EU enlargement. The third section introduces case studies of security influence on the enlargement process. Each case study analyses how the eastern enlargement of the EU and European security issues have been discursively linked by various EU leaders, and how such a discourse has been used to justify radical measures for enlargement. The article concludes by examining specific roles and functions of security in the context of eastern enlargement. It should be noted that, in order to make a specific argument about the EU, this article focuses on the security discourse emerging *within* the EU, not from the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs).³

The 'Copenhagen School' and the Concept of Security

The central refrain in the EU discourse has linked enlargement to peace and security. In order to analyse the links, it is necessary to conceptualize the mechanism by which policy leaders discursively *construct* and *present* certain issues in terms of security. Such a mechanism cannot be grasped by the traditional concept of security, which takes the 'objectivity' of security for granted.

Some of the concepts developed by the CS provide a useful analytical tool with which to examine such a mechanism. Among others, the 'security

as a speech act' (known as 'securitization') approach, which is at the core of the CS, is particularly useful for exploring 'the logic of security' (Buzan et al., 1998: 4). The following paragraphs briefly introduce the basic assumptions behind the CS, followed by an explanation as to why this approach can be advantageous for analysing the security argument in the context of EU enlargement.

Essentially, the CS rejects any objective definition of security. Security is not a concept with a fixed meaning, and therefore it cannot be objectively defined. The CS claims that 'the sense of threat, vulnerability and (in)security are socially constructed rather than objectively present or absent' (Buzan et al., 1998: 57). What, then, is security? According to the CS, security is not simply a matter of 'survival in the face of existential threat' (Buzan et al., 1998: 27), but, more centrally, a 'speech act' (Wæver, 1995: 54).⁴ Anything becomes a security issue when it is named as one. Security is the 'move' that takes politics 'beyond the established rules of the game' and frames the issue either as 'a special kind of politics' or 'above politics', elevating the issue to 'absolute priority' (Buzan et al., 1998: 176). The significant contribution of this approach is that, by focusing on a 'special rhetorical structure' (Buzan et al., 1998: 26) as a condition for something to become a security issue, it successfully presents 'the solution to the problem involved in broadening the definition of *security* without thereby robbing it of its analytical utility' (Hyde-Price, 2001: 39; italics in original). It 'can function as a tool to find security actors and phenomena in sectors other than the military-political one, where it is often hard to define when to include new issues on the security agenda' (Hyde-Price, 2001: 39).

The rhetorical move which makes an object a security issue is 'securitization', a process which starts with a 'securitizing move' made by 'securitizing actors' (Buzan et al., 1998: 24). In order for an issue to be a security matter, 'securitizing actors', who are typically 'state representatives' or, more broadly, the 'political elite' (Buzan et al., 1998: 29), name something as an 'existential threat', and therefore claim that, since the need to deal with such a threat is urgent, 'a special right' is required to deal with the issue through 'extraordinary means', breaking the normal rules of the political game. Such a speech act is called a 'securitizing move'. By making such a move, securitizing actors *present* and *dramatize* the issue as a security matter which requires and justifies extraordinary means. If and when the 'audience' accepts it as such, 'securitization' is successful (Buzan et al., 1998: 25). Therefore, this approach places strong emphasis on the policy-makers' security logic. By so doing, it stimulates the thought that any policy which has security implications is 'not given by "nature"', but 'chosen by politicians and decision-makers who have an interest in defining it in just that way' (Knudsen, 2001: 359).

The CS argues that 'security' or 'securitization' should not be seen as necessarily good, because security can be regarded as a failure to deal with issues as 'normal politics' (Buzan et al., 1998: 29). Security is, at best, 'a kind of stabilisation of conflictual and threatening relations' (Buzan et al., 1998: 4). It is for this reason that they propose the concept of 'desecuritization' as the 'long-range optimal option'. 'Desecuritization' means 'not to have issues

phrased as “threats against which we have countermeasures”, but to move them out of this threat-defence sequence and into the ordinary public sphere’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 29). To put it more simply, it is ‘the shifting of the issues out of the emergency model and into the normal bargaining process of the political sphere’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 4). The CS suggests that a ‘securitizing move’ can result in one of two different effects — ‘securitization’, which is to phrase an issue as ‘threats against which we have countermeasures’, or ‘desecuritization’, which is to move them out of this threat-defence sequence and into the ‘ordinary’ public sphere.

The most outstanding example of desecuritization is European integration, in particular the integration that occurred at the end of the Cold War: a considerable number of speeches that strongly promoted integration were made by various actors in order to dissuade the EU public from going down the dangerous path towards a fragmented Europe. With the fading of the initial euphoria at the end of the Cold War, scepticism and distrust towards integration were suddenly observable elsewhere in Western European countries, mainly driven by deep economic recession, the monetary crisis in certain countries and their inability to respond to the series of crises in Yugoslavia.⁵ In order to remove such pessimism about integration, European elites have warned of the heavy costs of choosing *not* to integrate, such as the fragmentation of the EU, the rise of nationalism and, in more extreme cases, a return to Europe’s previous balance-of-power system and war. Indeed, ‘[t]he first and foremost threat articulated in securitisation within the EU is Europe’s own past’ (Diez, 2001: 6). In order not to allow Europe’s own past to become its future, integration has been made an aim in itself, and an explicit link between security and integration has been constructed.

By adding the security argument, integration gains urgency because its alternative is a self-propelling process that by definition will destroy ‘Europe’ as a project and reopen the previous insecurity caused by balance of power, nationalism and war. Integration gains a grammatical form closer to security logic. (Buzan et al., 1998: 179–91; see also Wæver, 1995: 71–5; Wæver, 1996: 120–8)

Therefore, according to the CS, the whole enterprise of European integration is the most obvious example of a securitizing move (naming something as an existential threat), which leads to a desecuritizing effect (continuation of European integration). Here, European integration has been *presented* as an ‘extraordinary measure’ which drags Europe away from a catastrophic future of hatred and confusion. This suggests that, while the argument is based on security, the long-term effect will be desecuritization.

Conceptualizing EU Enlargement: A ‘Desecuritizing Effect’ via ‘Securitizing Moves’

There are at least three reasons why the CS approach can be a useful tool in an analysis of the link between security and EU enlargement. First, just

as the 'speech act' approach maintains, definitions, concepts and objectives of security have often shifted with the various stages of EU enlargement. European security was, in one case, associated with the modernization of the economies of CEECs (European Council, 1993). In another case, it was associated with the solution to border conflicts and minority problems between the CEECs (Balladur and Kohl, 1994). In such cases, the CS's approach allows us to see how certain problems have been discursively constructed as a security issue in the enlargement process.

Second, the rhetorical structure of the 'securitizing move' clearly exists in many EU leaders' speeches and statements concerning eastern enlargement. The 'securitizing actors' in the EU — leaders of the EU member countries and institutions who have direct responsibility for enlargement policy-making — have made a number of 'securitizing moves' that identify various 'existential threats' to European security and call for EU enlargement as an 'extraordinary means' to rescue the European continent as a whole. Consider, for example, the statement by the Danish Prime Minister Anders Gogh Rasmussen (2002):

Just as we thought that nationalism, aggression and war had become unthinkable in Europe, we became witnesses to the brutal conflicts in the Balkans. This demonstrated that lasting peace in Europe would only come about through the unification of Europe. Now we must deliver on the promises. We have a historic and moral obligation to seize the present opportunity to consolidate peace and create the basis for progress across the entire continent.

In this statement he names wars and conflicts in the past and present as existential threats for the entire continent, and claims that such disasters can only be avoided by adopting an extraordinary measure, i.e. by enlarging the EU, despite all the difficulties and concerns. In this way, he makes a 'securitizing move' in order to call for further advancement of the enlargement process. Therefore, by examining the securitizing moves by EU leaders, one can follow the way in which the security logic plays a role in providing justifications and legitimizations for the enlargement-related decisions in the period 'from Copenhagen to Copenhagen'.

Third, the CS's distinction between 'securitizing move' (discursive action) and 'securitization or desecuritization' (consequence or effect) explains perfectly the relationship between discourse and policy instruments in the enlargement process. Importantly, the CS suggests that even though a 'securitizing move' dramatizes a certain issue as a matter of survival, the actual policy instrument which derives from such a move might well be a 'desecuritized' one: an issue being shifted into 'the normal bargaining process of the political sphere'. As argued above, the security logic presented in the context of European integration was made to push forward the integration process and, thus, to desecuritize Europe. Likewise, EU enlargement can be grasped as a repetitive process of 'securitizing moves' which were made to generate a 'desecuritizing effect'. While enlargement has been presented as an 'extraordinary means' for the European continent, enlargement has been an example of a 'regular activity' of the EU: 'the issue of enlargement

has been on the EU's agenda almost since its inception' (Croft et al., 1998: 56). Therefore, the CS's approach effectively explains a mechanism in which an issue is presented in security logic and then is actually dealt with in the normal bargaining process.

However, in this regard, the CS does not sufficiently explain one crucial point: in what context can desecuritization occur? What directs a securitizing move to bring about a desecuritizing effect? Again, in order for an issue to be desecuritized or to have a desecuritizing effect, it has to be dealt with as 'normal politics'. Therefore, as a prerequisite, there has to be a collective sense within the EU, which grasps enlargement as something to be done as a part of the normal and intrinsic business of the EU. Does such a sense exist within the EU? If so, how has it been created?

In the case of Europe, such a sense seems to derive from values, beliefs and feelings of historical and moral obligation, which are imbedded in the European construction project. As Helen Wallace argues:

The EC and later the EU were in part devised to contribute to democratic stabilisation as the club of European liberal democracies, characterised also by their functioning market economies. Hence the EU was bound to be preoccupied with enlargement as a challenge, each time that newly democratic neighbours wanted to join this club. (2000: 50)

Such argument incorporates economic, cultural and historical considerations to enlargement debates. In addition, as Frank Schimmelfennig claims, European integration has been legitimated by the ideology of a pan-European community of liberal-democratic states since its beginning. Therefore, the actors within the EU who advocate enlargement have used such a norm-based argument strategically to claim that enlarging the Union is in line with the 'institutional standard of political legitimacy' of the EU. Such narrative has effectively 'silenced' opposition to enlargement (Schimmelfennig, 2001). In this context, arguably, securitizing moves which call for enlargement have emerged out of the feeling of EU policy-making circles that the *raison d'être* and credibility of the EU would seriously be challenged if the EU did not respond properly to the new democracies' aspirations to join the Union. In particular, with the Kosovo crisis going on in the immediate neighbourhood of the current candidates, securitizing actors warned that delaying enlargement was equal to 'allow[ing] a zone of instability to emerge beyond the current EU border', which was, 'given our experience in the Balkans, irresponsible politically' (Fischer, 1999a). This very mindset can be considered to be the prerequisite for a securitizing move to bring about a desecuritizing effect.

This partly explains why so many of the securitizing moves by EU leaders contain logic that is closely intertwined with 'democratic peace' rhetoric. Consider, for example, the article written by John Major, the then British Prime Minister:

If we fail to bring the democratic countries of Eastern and Central Europe into our Community, we risk recreating division in Europe — between haves

and have-nots. Through Community membership, we can consolidate democracy and prosperity across our continent. Without it, we risk turmoil among neighbours in Eastern and Central Europe and endanger our own long-term prosperity and stability. (1993)

Such combinations of rhetoric have consistently existed in the arguments in favour of enlargement. When expressed within a 'securitizing move', this rhetoric has strongly pushed forward the enlargement process. Whereas 'democratic peace' rhetoric emphasizes 'reasons', 'benefits' and 'moral obligations' for enlargement, 'securitizing moves' appeal to the potential 'costs' and 'risks' of non-enlargement. The 'democratic peace' rhetoric suggests 'we need to do this because it is necessary and beneficial for them and us'; 'securitizing moves' suggest 'if we *don't* do this, our future would be a disastrous one'. Complementing each other, these two sets of arguments provide the most powerful logic for the enlargement process to move forward.

EU Enlargement: Desecuritization in Practice

In the following section, I examine three cases of security influence in the context of the EU enlargement process: an early attempt by a limited number of EU leaders to put enlargement 'on the agenda'; the EU's decision in 1999 to alter the strategies and principles of enlargement; the EU's attempt to 'sell' enlargement to the public and to respond to the peoples' fears pertaining to it. In each case, I explore who made the securitizing moves, what threats were identified, how the eastern enlargement of the EU and European security issues were discursively linked, and how such a discourse has been used to justify radical measures towards enlargement. By so doing, I demonstrate that security concerns have exerted a different kind of influence and have created different outcomes in each stage of the enlargement process.

In analysing securitizing moves in terms of EU enlargement, I shed light on four of their important components: the threat expressed in the securitizing moves, the rhetorical structure of the securitizing moves, and securitizing actors and their 'audiences'. The nature and the scope of the threats expressed in the securitizing moves made by EU leaders differ considerably in all three cases. In the first case, the most commonly expressed threats were the existential conflicts in the ex-Yugoslav republics or potential instability of Russia (Commission, 1993: 3), Europe's own bitter past, such as 'a return to the unstable pre-war system' (CDU/CSU, 1994) or a perspective to create an artificial dividing line within Europe (Major, 1993). In the second case, the named threats were concentrated on the Kosovo crisis, and the possibility that such turbulence might spread to the whole of the Balkan region (Blair, 1999a; Commission, 1999b; Fischer, 1999a). In the last case, the named threats were social disorder, which appeared in public discourse as the likely result of enlargement: mass migration from the East, loss of jobs, organized crime and environmental degradation, and so forth (Verheugen, 2000). However, the rhetorical structure of the 'securitizing moves' has gone through few changes throughout the enlargement process:

it refers to various uncertainties as 'existential threats', and claims that EU enlargement would be an 'extraordinary means' of countering them.

The Commission, Britain and Germany have consistently been the 'securitizing actors' throughout the period from Copenhagen to Copenhagen, making securitizing moves in favour of enlargement. Such actors targeted leaders of member states of the EU as their 'audiences', who had little interest in pushing forward the enlargement process. The aim of the securitizing moves was therefore to persuade them to take steps toward enlargement. However, as will be argued below, in the crucial moments for enlargement, such as in 1999, there was a considerable increase in the number of securitizing actors speaking out in favour of enlargement in the name of peace and security. Moreover, the attitude of the previously reluctant audiences changed significantly: not only did they promptly accept those security-based arguments, they also agreed to alter the enlargement strategy drastically to speed up the process. As the enlargement process approached its final stages, the audience of the securitizing moves favouring enlargement was the larger public.

Putting Enlargement on the Agenda

In the earliest stage of the enlargement process, securitizing moves called for eastern enlargement as an inevitable future for the EU, and successfully persuaded reluctant EU member states at least to put enlargement on the agenda. The earliest and strongest call to provide the CEECs with a promise for their future accession came from the Commission, in particular on the eve of the Copenhagen European Council. It strongly called for EU member states to 'confirm, in a clear political message, its commitment to membership of the Union for Europe agreements signatories when they are able to satisfy the condition required' (Commission, 1993: 3). The argument was delivered with clear security logic; it argued that uncertainties within the CEECs could only be settled by giving them 'a clear perspective of their future participation in the process of the European Union'. Doing so would, above all, 'provide an element of stability against the background of continuing turbulence in the former Soviet Union and the tragedy unfolding in the former Yugoslavia', and 'diminish tension in a region where confidence and stability are suffering from the absence of a viable security structure' (Commission, 1993: 1-2). This argument by the Commission formed a typical securitizing move which called for 'extraordinary measures' in order to bring a 'desecuritizing effect' in post-Cold War Europe: the CEECs were facing various 'existential threats'; the EU needed to provide them with the prospect of future accession as an 'extraordinary measure', so that the CEECs would be able to overcome such threats. In so doing, such measures would create 'a greater sense of belonging to the process of European Integration', which would 'reduce feelings of insecurity and consequent tensions in the region, with gains for overall security and cooperation' (Commission, 1993: 3).

The securitizing move made by the Commission was accepted by the member states at the Copenhagen European Council in 1993. Member

states agreed to refer to the future possibility of eastern enlargement and to establish conditions for becoming member countries of the EU, which are now widely known as the 'Copenhagen criteria', comprising three elements: (1) to achieve the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities (political criteria); (2) to have a functioning market economy, and to be able to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the Union (economic criteria); and (3) to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union (*acquis communautaire*).

However, the EU's decision at Copenhagen should not be taken as a sign that all EU member states shared the Commission's sense of urgency. The extraordinary means called for by the Commission was to show the EU's will that enlargement should and could happen *in the future*, in itself not a particularly difficult step for EU members to take. Inevitably, such a promise did not bring with it a clear path towards the realization of enlargement, and some, therefore, questioned its credibility (Mayhew, 1998: 29).

Moreover, it should be noted that securitizing moves made by EU leaders have not always been made in order to further the enlargement process: they have also called for and produced instruments not necessarily welcomed by all the CEECs. In particular, from 1993 to 1995, concerns about potential ethnic conflicts among the CEECs led the EU to make the complete solutions to such disputes an implicit 'condition' of EU accession.

One such example is the Stability Pact, initiated by the French government. Just a few days before the Copenhagen meeting, Paris submitted its own criteria for the CEECs to join the EU, which insisted that solving minority problems in CEECs *completely* and ensuring domestic unity should become one of the political criteria (*Agence Europe*, 1993, no. 6003).⁶ Although this attempt by the French government failed to alter the Copenhagen criteria, the basic idea of its proposal survived in the form of the Stability Pact which was submitted by France at the Copenhagen European Council. The objective of this plan was to encourage the CEECs to solve their potential disputes and border conflicts among one other. It targeted mainly the potential members of the EU, namely, those countries that had concluded or were negotiating the European Agreements.

In explaining the significance of such a plan, French government officials linked the implementation of the Pact by the CEECs with their future EU accessions. Alain Lamassoure, the French Minister of European Affairs, claimed that 'admission to the EU is only possible for countries that maintain good relations with their neighbours. No countries with unsettled border or minority conflicts will be allowed to join'.⁷ Likewise, Alain Juppé, the French Foreign Minister, repeatedly mentioned that this Pact was to 'prepare for the European Union's enlargement'.⁸ Thus, by making a strategy to link security and stability with membership, the French government successfully created a new policy instrument in the enlargement process. It was indeed in this period during which the Stability Pact had been discussed that the EU member states started to associate security with enlargement.

The settlement of any disputes thus became a *de facto* condition for eastern enlargement.

Therefore, in the very early stage of the enlargement process, two security arguments were competing with regard to EU enlargement: securitizing moves represented by the Commission, urging the EU to enlarge in order to build security in the CEECs, and those represented by the French government, which warned *not* to take any substantial decisions with regard to enlargement when CEECs were facing considerable security problems. Gradually, however, security arguments in favour of enlargement gained ground. This was partly driven by the fact that the governments of the CEECs were rushing to formally apply to the EU from spring 1994 onwards, which made it extremely difficult for the actors of the EU to stay silent on this matter. Visiting Hungary on the eve of its application to the EU, Jacques Delors, the President of the Commission, stated that 'post-Communism opened an era of instability ... The best possible solution is the accession to the Community' (*Agence Europe*, 1994, no. 6185). Leon Brittan, the Commissioner for external relations, warned in an interview to a newspaper that, if the countries that had concluded the European Agreements did not get a clear promise for future enlargement, they would all fall under the influence of Russia (*Le Monde*, 19 June 1994). John Major, the British Prime Minister, argued:

If we fail to bring the democratic countries of Eastern and Central Europe into our Community, we risk recreating division in Europe — between haves and have-nots ... Without it, we risk turmoil among neighbours in Eastern and Central Europe and endanger our own long-term prosperity and stability. (1993)⁹

Characteristic of these securitizing moves, however, was a lack of substantiality: they contained no specific timetables and modalities of future enlargement, despite their strong articulation of the 'existential threat'.¹⁰ The objective of securitizing moves in this period was as modest as to urge EU members to react positively to the desire of the CEECs to join the EU and to do *something* about enlargement.

Still, as a result, references to European peace and security were gradually embedded in enlargement-related official statements of the EU. More significantly, concrete policy steps for enlargement and security-based justifications came to be paired discursively in these statements. In particular, this can be seen in the Presidency Conclusions of the Essen European Council in December 1994 and those of the Madrid European Council in December 1995. The former meeting, which officially decided to embark on the programme known as 'Pre-Accession Strategy', claimed that preparing for the future accession of the associated CEECs was to ensure 'the lasting peace and stability of the European continent and neighbouring regions'. The EU enlargement was 'making an essential contribution to overcoming the legacy of past divisions, and promoting peace, security and stability in and around Europe' (European Council, 1994). The latter meeting, which decided that the Commission would prepare its 'Opinions' for the applicant

countries and a 'Composite Paper on Enlargement', stated that enlargement would 'ensure the stability and security of the continent' and would thus offer both the applicant states and the current members of the Union new prospects for economic growth and general well-being (European Council, 1995). The decision in Madrid suggested that the process of eastern enlargement was entering a new and significant stage to consider the readiness and eligibility of each of the applicant countries.

To summarize, a very limited number of securitizing actors, mainly the Commission, made securitizing moves which named turbulence in the ex-Yugoslavian republics or the instability of Russia as the potential threats for European peace and security, and called for swift enlargement. As a result, between 1993 and 1995, a rhetoric that highlighted 'eastern enlargement for security and stability in the whole of Europe' emerged and was successfully implanted into the official language of the EU in order to justify actions toward enlargement. However, partly because the original objectives of the securitizing actors — to call for a serious and committed preparation for enlargement — were fulfilled by the agreement in Madrid, and partly due to the fact that the preparation of the 'Opinions' was put into the hands of the Commission and provided EU leaders with an excuse, 'there was little that could be done until the Commission had completed its Opinions' (Mayhew, 1998), and securitizing speeches urging enlargement had disappeared from the discourses of EU leaders. With such major crises as the lack of progress in the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) to reform EU institutions, enlargement had slipped out of the view of many governments (Mayhew, 1998). Therefore, it was not until completion of the Opinion in July 1997 ('Agenda 2000') that debates on eastern enlargement returned as the main agenda for the EU. Inevitably, security arguments also disappeared from the speeches by EU leaders until the publication of the 'Agenda 2000'.

Bringing in the 'Non-Eligibles'

In July 1997, the Commission recommended the commencement of accession negotiations with the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia plus Cyprus (the '5 plus 1' formula) in the 'Agenda 2000' (Commission, 1997). In the process of choosing candidate countries to initiate the negotiations, it was revealed that there were two competing security arguments concerning the way in which the enlargement process should proceed. On the one hand, the Commission made a judgement that Estonia and Slovenia should be included in the negotiations to 'give pointers to the Commission's intentions' to enlarge the EU to two delicate regions in Europe — the former USSR republics and ex-Yugoslav republics (Mayhew, 1998: 36). On the other hand, France and Nordic members insisted that, if the EU was to start accession negotiations at all, then no candidate countries should be left out of the process, because doing otherwise would create a 'dangerous dividing line' between candidate countries (Avery and Cameron, 1998). Eventually, the decision at the Luxembourg European Council in December 1997 sided with the Commission's

argument. This was justified partly from the viewpoint that the enlargement process should adhere to its iron rule, that is, to start the accession negotiations with candidate countries which fulfilled *all* the Copenhagen criteria. This decision inevitably divided the candidate countries into 'first-wavers', those which were to start negotiations immediately, and 'second-wavers', those which had to wait and prepare further. One security argument thus prevailed over another.

After this decision, the issue at stake in the enlargement process was when to include second-wavers in the negotiations. However, curiously, the security argument which had insisted upon the simultaneous start of accession negotiations with all the countries vanished immediately after the decision at the Luxembourg European Council, and until the very end of 1998 there was no sense of urgency to start negotiations with 'second-wavers'. In particular, the inclusion of Bulgaria and Romania, the least prepared candidate countries, in the formal accession negotiations was not considered as a realistic option in 1998. The choice after Luxembourg was therefore whether to include the most prepared countries of the second-wave, namely, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Malta, in the formal negotiation, or let all the 'second-wavers' wait. Before the Vienna European Council in December 1998, the overwhelming majority of EU members preferred the latter choice. In particular, the French, Italian and Greek governments continued to make securitizing moves, claiming that if the EU picked up some countries from the 'second-wavers', it would create a 'division within the second-wavers' which could seriously destabilize the region (*Agence Europe*, 1998, no. 7339).

Apparent deterioration of the situation in Kosovo from mid-December 1998 and the NATO campaign there in March 1999 altered this state of stagnation with regard to enlargement. The argument that 'our experience during the Kosovo conflict must lend the enlargement process a new dynamism' emerged and was widely accepted (Fischer, 1999b). Such discourse led the EU to renew its policy with regard to two groups in this region, namely the south-eastern European countries that had so far been out of the enlargement process, and Romania and Bulgaria, two countries already in the enlargement process but not, at this time, involved in the accession negotiations.

With regard to the south-eastern European countries, the Commission proposed in May 1999 that the EU should consider concluding 'a new type of association agreement' with the five countries in the region (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, Macedonia and Albania). Through such agreements, the Commission maintained, the EU would be able to assist in the establishment of democracy, the rule of law, economic development and regional cooperation in this region, but more importantly, to offer a perspective that those five countries would be fully integrated in the European structure (Commission, 1999a). This proposal was formally submitted to the Cologne European Council in June 1999 and later adopted as the 'Stabilization and Association Process'. For the first time, therefore, the EU opened up the perspective for the future accession of ex-Yugoslav republics.

This unusually swift action taken by the EU was mainly driven by the growing sense within the EU that a preventive measure was needed if Europe wished to avoid ethnic conflicts like Kosovo to spread to the rest of the Balkan region: in particular, concerns about Macedonia and Montenegro were immediate: Macedonia was considered a country 'with a Slav-dominated government and an ethnic-Albanian minority, making up a quarter to a third of the population, [which] is just another one country in the neighbourhood waiting to disintegrate', and Montenegro was known to be demanding independence from the Yugoslav federation, which might well cause yet another civil war.¹¹ Therefore, the EU's swift action towards the south-eastern countries was driven by this stark sense of urgency.

However, the more imminent change in the EU enlargement strategy came in the reviewing of the policy towards Romania and Bulgaria, the candidate countries so far being 'the most weakly supported among the current membership' (Wallace, 1996: 27). The earliest securitizing move to call for a decisive action for those two countries came from Tony Blair, the British Prime Minister, when he visited Romania in early May 1999:

The instability is on our continent, but in your neighbourhood. We are moved by the crisis. Your future is threatened by it. ... At the Helsinki European Council in December, Britain will support an invitation to Romania to begin negotiations to accede to the European Union. (1999a)¹²

This securitizing move made by Blair was to argue that an 'extraordinary measure', i.e. the start of accession negotiations, could effectively counter the negative impact of the Kosovo crisis, an existential threat which might well destabilize all the neighbouring Balkan countries. This statement marked a clear change of position on enlargement on the part of the British government which formerly had emphasized the danger of 'opening talks with those who still are not yet ready' (Cook, 1997; Lippert et al., 2001: 10–11). Instead, the British government was implying that, when candidate countries are facing clear threats in the heart of their neighbourhood, the EU should start negotiations with them to mitigate the deteriorating effect, and that in this light the full compliance of the Copenhagen criteria was of less significance. This idea was widely accepted by almost all member countries. By early September 1999, consensus gradually emerged in the Council to start accession negotiations with all the second-wavers (*European Report*, 1999, no. 2432).

The momentum to renew the EU's policy towards Romania and Bulgaria was driven by two distinct motivations. First, a sense was growing, in particular within the Commission, that the previous strategy, which had made the second-wavers wait until they were fully prepared before starting accession negotiations, was becoming less and less effective.¹³ It failed to encourage their reforms as expected, but rather invited fatigue through endless reform. Therefore, the need for the EU to show the candidate countries 'a light at the end of the tunnel' was becoming increasingly apparent.¹⁴ Altering the *modus operandi* of the enlargement process could be, it was

considered, the best way to introduce a fresh momentum to the accession process of the second-wavers.

Second, the EU was concerned that promising a future perspective to the ex-Yugoslav countries might give the impression to Romania and Bulgaria that they would be 'outstripped' by the ex-Yugoslav countries, whose political and economic ties with the EU had been much weaker than those two countries' ties with the EU, and which had not even made formal applications for EU membership. In fact, it was reported that Bulgaria's concern was that 'Albania and Macedonia will soon catch up in the race to join the EU, though, unlike Bulgaria, neither country has an association agreement with it that is supposed to precede eventual membership' (*The Economist*, 29 May 1999). Therefore, a concern emerged within the EU that the launch of the new relationships with south-eastern Europe had to be done in an extremely cautious manner, so that such a move would not stir up any anxiety for those countries already in the enlargement process (*Agence Europe*, 1999, no. 7474). The EU had to find a way not to leave Romania and Bulgaria with a threefold dissatisfaction: not having been selected to start accession negotiations in 1997, being excluded from the group of 'second-wavers', and fearing being outstripped by the latecomers from south-eastern Europe.

However, the inclusion of Bulgaria and Romania in the accession negotiations was extremely difficult to justify because it would mean that the EU was discarding its own principle that it had defended so passionately in the course of the eastern enlargement, that is, as a prerequisite for starting EU accession negotiation, the applicant countries had to fulfil the political criteria in full, and an evident prospect had to be shown to fulfil economic criteria in the near future. Since it was clear that those two countries would not be able to fulfil the economic criteria by the end of the year, the question was how the EU would be able to justify and legitimize breaking its core principles for enlargement. There was the additional argument that if the practice of entering into negotiations with countries that had not reached an adequate level of preparation were to be established, a precedent would be created for future accessions, and the following of a different practice might later prove difficult (Commission, 1999b: 19).

Eventually, a securitizing move made by the Commission played a huge role in finding a good justification for changing the existing rules and principles of enlargement. The 'Composit Paper' by the Commission in October 1999 presented the Kosovo crisis as an 'existential threat' for the European continent as a whole and urged that, in the light of such a situation, the enlargement process had to be driven forward and 'resolute and courageous action' had to be taken. The Commission then proposed an 'emergency measure' for the EU: the establishing of a new rule to 'open negotiations with all candidates that have fulfilled the *political* Copenhagen criteria', and to ensure that candidate countries fulfil all Copenhagen criteria before being admitted as member states to the EU (Commission, 1999b: 29–31). In defence of this measure, Romano Prodi, the President of the European Commission, warned that continuing the previous 'hard line' method, restricting the opening of negotiations to countries which had ful-

filled all three conditions, could only bring a disastrous outcome: 'the countries concerned, having already made great efforts and sacrifices, will become disillusioned and turn their backs on us. Their economic policies will begin to diverge, and a historic opportunity will have been lost — perhaps forever' (Prodi, 1999). Such logic successfully led the EU to agree to change the existing principle of the enlargement process and to make the decision to start negotiations with all the second-wavers at the Helsinki European Council in December 1999.

To summarize, in this period, securitizing moves named Kosovo as the existential threat and called for emergency measures to renew the previous enlargement strategy. This had two far-reaching consequences. First, it successfully altered the enlargement strategy. This illustrated most clearly that the new direction of enlargement had been called for out of a stark sense of urgency and had been adopted with a clear security justification. It should be reiterated that such decisions came only one year after the Vienna European Council which had decided not to negotiate with any second-wavers. Arguably, with regard to the level of the fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria, nothing changed substantially between 1998 and 1999. While Malta, the two Baltic countries and Slovakia were already judged as having made considerable progress by the end of 1998, progress in Bulgaria and Romania was seriously lagging behind. What had changed between 1998 and 1999 was, therefore, not the level of the preparedness of the candidate countries, but the perception of the EU members of the necessity to reflect on the security aspects of enlargement.

Second, the conventional understandings among EU leaders about the connection between security and enlargement were considerably altered: the Kosovo crisis completely altered the 'security as a condition' argument, which had been so widespread within the EU when the Stability Pact was adopted in 1994. In other words, a drastic change was observed in the EU's security arguments after Kosovo. Before Kosovo, the logical sequence of enlargement was that, as the first step, the CEECs should achieve peace and security within and between themselves, and then the EU could enlarge. After Kosovo, however, the EU completely changed the argument: the promises for future enlargement should be given to the CEECs in the first place, so that the EU could play a role in achieving peace and security in the CEECs. Initiating accession negotiations with those candidate countries which were seriously affected by the crisis came to be regarded as the most powerful tool to provide such perspectives, and thus to create security and stability in the region.

'Selling' Enlargement to the Public

After the Helsinki European Council, there was a considerable change in the nature of securitizing moves by EU leaders, in particular, their 'audience' and 'sector'. Before Helsinki, the audiences of such moves made by EU policy-makers were other policy-makers in the EU, so securitizing moves therefore served as a discursive tool by which EU leaders reached agreement. However, when the Göteborg European Council in June 2001

decided the date for accepting new entrant countries to be 2004, and when the Laeken European Council in December 2001 stated that 10 new countries might conclude their accession negotiations at the end of 2002, a sense grew among EU leaders that enlargement, which would occur in the very near future, had to be explained to EU citizens. Throughout the 1990s, particularly at the national level, the strategy was to keep further EU enlargement out of the public debate. The issue of whether and how eastern enlargement should be approached was left to opposition parties. In some member states, populists (such as Jörg Haider and his FPÖ in Austria) made ready use of this 'opportunity' to gain votes by raising fears of immigration and potential job losses (Falkner and Nentwich, 2001: 273). Observing such a situation, Prodi claimed that Haider had 'worked on the fears' of European citizens concerning EU enlargement, and warned that 'unless we find a way to explain to people about the positive side of enlargement, there will be more Haider's' (Prodi, 2000).

Precisely out of this concern, EU leaders embarked on a communication strategy which aimed at 'selling' enlargement to the public, hoping to eliminate fears and reluctance among EU citizens with regard to enlargement. A large proportion of such publicity activities were done through the making of securitizing moves: in explaining the benefits of enlargement to the public, security aspects were highlighted in all the relevant statements and documents. 'After the year 2000 onwards', one official of the Commission said:

[W]e have consciously emphasised peace, stability and security as the prime reason to enlarge the Union, while putting economic benefits as the second reason. Making peace and security arguments made it *much easier* for us to explain to the public why this enlargement has to happen.¹⁵

Just as the audience of the securitizing moves shifted to the citizens from the year 2000 onward, so did the sectors referred to in these arguments. The core concern of EU citizens was societal disorder caused by enlargement: mass migration from the new entrant countries, organized crime and environmental degradation. Accordingly, the new securitizing moves became less concerned about articulating ethnic conflicts in the Balkans as the existing threat for the European continent and calling for swift enlargement as the extraordinary measure. Rather, EU leaders started to enumerate potential societal problems commonly perceived among EU citizens, and presented enlargement as 'the only solution' for those problems. The statement made by Günter Verheugen, the enlargement commissioner, was a glaring example of such logic:

Will there be waves of immigrants and what impacts will this have on job markets? How will the competitive status quo between current and new Member States in border regions change? Will there be environmental and social dumping? What are the implications of open borders for the fight against crime and, finally, how will we pay for it all? We have good answers for all these questions. Enlargement will reduce the number of immigrants... There will be no environmental or social dumping because the new members will

have to adopt our standards. Enlargement is good for the environment. Enlargement is also good for the level of social security in Europe ... things will become better, not worse, as the result of enlargement. ... It would be far riskier if we failed to do what needs to be done. (Verheugen, 2000)

However, whether the audience would really accept these securitizing moves made by EU leaders had extremely limited relevance to the enlargement process at that time. This communication strategy by the EU failed to go beyond one-way persuasion. While these securitizing moves were clearly aimed at explaining and persuading the public about the benefit of enlargement and the cost of non-enlargement, the enlargement process was so fast approaching its conclusion that it was too late for the process to be affected at all by any scepticism that might be voiced by EU citizens. Furthermore, since none of the current EU member governments had decided to hold a referendum to consult the will of EU citizens regarding whether or not enlargement should take place, there was no practical way for the EU public to express their concerns and opposition to enlargement.

Partly helped by that, the enlargement negotiations with 10 candidate countries were finalized at the Copenhagen European Council in December 2002, with little sign that securitizing moves would be accepted as such by the European public. The Presidency Conclusions of the meeting concluded by carving in a now familiar phrase:

The European Council in Copenhagen in 1993 launched an ambitious process to overcome the legacy of conflict and division in Europe ... [t]his achievement (to reach the agreement to welcome ten new countries) testifies to the common determination of the peoples of Europe to come together in a Union that has become the driving force for peace, democracy, stability and prosperity on our continent. (European Council, 2002)

Conclusions

In this article, I have explored the role of security concerns in the EU's enlargement eastwards. Many statements linking enlargement and security have been identified. The concept of security has been used as 'a speech act' approach (or 'securitization' approach) by the CS in order to explore how such links have been discursively constructed. In addition, it has been established that the CS argues for European integration as an example of desecuritization. This article has contended that the same mechanism is observable in the context of EU enlargement. I have grasped EU enlargement as a repetitive process of 'securitizing moves' made to bring about a 'desecuritizing effect', in order to facilitate the understanding of its particular mechanism, in which an issue is presented in security logic and then is actually dealt with in normal politics. The three cases examined in this article can be considered as steps to desecuritize Europe.

As I demonstrated, the EU leaders' justification of enlargement very often took the form of the 'securitizing move': this refers to various uncertainties as 'existential threats' and claims that EU enlargement would be an

'extraordinary means' to counter them. Threats named at each stage of the enlargement process varied considerably. In the very early stage, they were Europe's own past, the conflicts in ex-Yugoslav republics and uncertainty in Russia, an artificial dividing line within Europe, the CEECs' loss of will to reform, 'the old system of balance with ... the permanent danger of nationalist ideologies and confrontations in Eastern Europe'. In the late 1990s, the named threat was almost exclusively the Kosovo crisis and possible proliferation of such a crisis throughout the European continent.

The Commission, Britain and Germany have consistently been the 'securitizing actors' throughout the process. In the early stage of enlargement, 'audiences' for such securitizing moves were leaders of member states of the EU who had little interest in pushing forward the enlargement process. The aim of the securitizing moves was therefore to persuade them to take steps toward enlargement. However, as seen in this article, in the crucial moments for enlargement such as in 1999, the number of securitizing actors speaking in favour of enlargement in the name of peace and security increased considerably, and the attitudes of the previously reluctant audiences were significantly altered. As the enlargement process approached its final stage, the EU public became the main audience of the securitizing moves.

The EU has long been criticized for having been reluctant to enlarge eastwards. In particular, in the early 1990s, there was almost a consensus within academia that the policy could only be described more as 'a conglomeration of discrete activities than the result of a well-developed strategy' (Kramer, 1993: 221), 'dilatatory, technical and ad hoc' (Lippert, 2002: 32), 'disjointed incrementalism' (Wallace, 1996: 4) or having been undertaken with 'no sense of urgency' (Grabbe and Hughes, 1998: 2). Therefore, it was largely considered that, if enlargement had been an issue about security, it would have been undertaken with a greater sense of urgency. However, while it is true that the attitude of the EU towards enlargement was a distinctively reluctant one, security concerns played a significant role in urging EU leaders to lessen their previous reluctance and to modify their strategies for enlargement. As argued in this article, the decisions at the Helsinki European Council in December 1999, which marked crucial changes in the EU enlargement strategy, are the most glaring example of this. Arguably, therefore, it was the power of the security discourse which pushed the EU strongly in the direction of enlargement, despite the unprecedented and huge difficulties which emerged in the course of the process.

Notes

Earlier versions of this paper was presented at the European Union Studies Associations International Conference (Nashville, 27–9 March 2003), the British International Studies Association Annual Conference (Birmingham, 15–17 December 2003) and the Student Conference of the Centre for German and European Studies, University of Georgetown (Washington DC, 20–1 February 2004). I thank Thomas Diez and Stuart Croft for helping me throughout this project to clar-

ify my thought on the subject. I also thank Sebastien Loisel, Adrian Treacher and Michito Tsuruoka, the editor of *Cooperation and Conflict*, and two reviewers for their detailed and useful comments.

1. This article shares the definition of '(public) discourse' with that proffered in the work of Vivien Schmidt, who defines it as 'the sum of political actors' public account of the policy's purpose, goals and political identities, to reshape and/or reinterpret political history, and, all in all, to frame the national policy discussion' (2000: 279).

2. There are, however, examples of works which have provided arguments for the link between security concerns and EU enlargement (Wallace, 1996; Smith, 1999; Lippert et al., 2001; Missiroli, 2002).

3. In addition, this article does not deal with the cases of three of the candidate countries, Cyprus, Malta and Turkey, since the nature of the security issues concerning those three countries is completely different from those of the CEECs.

4. There is a long tradition of speech act theory, which has recently begun to seep into IR theory. The ideas at the core of this theory are as follows: first, certain categories of speech do not simply describe or convey information, but are acts in and of themselves. Acts of this kind are referred to as 'performatives'. Saying something is doing something. Second, speech acts are dependent on a context for their meaning. Third, speech acts do not necessarily presuppose any face-to-face communications; all that matters is that the content of the speech act is conveyed by one party to another (Kratochwil, 1989; Fierke and Wiener, 2001: 127–8).

5. For examples of such speeches by European leaders, the CS lists the following materials: Mitterand (1995) and Santer (1995).

6. According to another source, this French proposal included other criteria as well, such as GNP per capita level, degree of privatization, level of social protection, inflation levels and public deficit size. See *European Report*, 1993, no. 1868.

7. Cited in 'Whose stability pact?', *The Economist*, 18 March 1995.

8. For example, see *Agence Europe*, 1994, no. 6239.

9. In general, the German and British officials were the keenest to associate this enlargement with an exercise to build a safe and stable Europe. In April 1994, for example, Douglas Hurd, British Foreign Secretary, and his German counterpart, Klaus Kinkel, contributed jointly to newspapers to claim that, for their countries, the most important item on the agenda of Europe for the following years was to extend into the central and eastern parts of the European continent the stability and prosperity which had been achieved in the west. For example, see Hurd and Kinkel (1994).

10. The only exception came from the German parties, CDU and CSU, in September 1994. This is best known as proposing to create a 'core Europe' among the six leading EU members. With regard to the EU enlargement eastwards, this paper called for it in the strongest possible words:

The only solution which will prevent a return to the unstable pre-war system, with Germany once again caught in the middle between East and West, is to integrate Germany's Central and Eastern neighbours into the European post-war system and to establish a wide-ranging partnership between this system and Russia. Never again must there be a destabilising vacuum of power in central Europe. If European integration were not to progress, Germany might be called upon, or tempted by its own security constraints, to try to effect the stabilisation of Eastern Europe on its own and in the traditional way.

It therefore called for 'enlargement by 2000', with Visegrad countries and Slovenia (CDU/CSU, 1994). However, such a specific securitizing move was clearly

an exception at that time. As argued, the overwhelming majority of securitizing speeches made moderate claims that the eastern enlargement had to be implemented.

11. The series of articles in *The Economist* illustrate the Western concerns for the Balkan region. 'No place for them both', *The Economist*, 3 April 1999: 'The powderkeg', *The Economist*, 29 April 1999: 'In the balance', *The Economist*, 8 May 1999: 'The next Kosovo', *The Economist*, 14 August 1999.

12. On his visit to Bulgaria one month later, Blair made the same commitment to Bulgaria (1999b).

13. Interview with an official of the Commission, 24 November 2003, Brussels.

14. Interview with an official of the Commission, 24 November 2003, Brussels.

15. Interview with an official of the Commission, 25 November 2003, Brussels.

References

Agence Europe, No. 6003, 18 June 1993.

Agence Europe, No. 6185, 7/8 March 1994.

Agence Europe, No. 6239, 28 May 1994.

Agence Europe, No. 7339, 10 November 1998.

Agence Europe, No. 7474, 29 May 1999.

Avery, Graham and Fraser, Cameron (1998) *The Enlargement of the European Union*. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press.

Balladur, Edouard and Kohl, Helmut (1994) 'Préparer la paix', *Le Monde*, 17 May.

Blair, Tony (1999a) Speech at the Romanian Parliament, Bucharest, 4 May. Speech transcript provided by the E-media Unit of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Blair, Tony (1999b) Speech at the Sofia University, Sofia, 17 May. Speech transcript provided by the E-media Unit of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Blair, Tony (2000) Speech at the Polish Stock Exchange, 6 October. Available at <http://www.fco.gov.uk>.

Buzan, Barry et al. (1998) *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

CDU/CSU (1994) *Fraktion des Deutschen Bundestages, Überlegeneugen zur europäischen Politik*, 1 September.

Commission (1993) *Towards a Closer Association with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe*, SEC(93)648, 18 May.

Commission (1997) *Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Europe*, COM(97)2000, 15 July.

Commission (1999a) *Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the Stabilisation and Association Process for Countries of South-Eastern Europe — Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania*. COM(99)235 final. 17 May.

Commission (1999b) *Composit Paper: Reports on Progress Towards Accession by Each of the Candidate Countries*, 13 October.

Cook, Robin (1997) Speech at the Institute for European Affairs, Dublin, Ireland, 3 November.

Croft, Stuart et al. (1998) *The Enlargement of Europe*. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press.

Diez, Thomas (2001) 'The Imposition of Governance: Transforming Foreign Policy through EU Enlargement', *COPRI Working Papers*.

- European Council (1993) *Conclusions of the Presidency, Copenhagen European Council*, 21 and 22 June.
- European Council (1994) *Conclusions of the Presidency, Essen European Council*, 9 and 10 December.
- European Council (1995) *Conclusions of the Presidency, Madrid European Council*, 15 and 16 December.
- European Council (1999) *Conclusions of the Presidency, Helsinki European Council*, 10 and 11 December.
- European Council (2002) *Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European Council*, 12 and 13 December.
- European Report*, No. 1868, 19 June 1993.
- European Report*, No. 2432, 8 September 1999.
- Falker, Gerda and Nentwich, Michael (2001) 'Enlarging the European Union: the Short-Term Success of Incrementalism and Depoliticisation', in J. Richardson (ed.), *European Union: Power and Policy-making*, 2nd edn, pp. 259–82. London and New York: Routledge.
- Fierke, Karin M. and Wiener, Antje (2001) 'Constructing Institutional Interests: EU and NATO Enlargement', in T. Christiansen, K. E. Jørgensen and A. Wiener, *The Social Construction of Europe*. London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi: Sage Publications.
- Fischer, Joschka (1999a) Speech at the European Parliament, Strasbourg, 12 January.
- Fischer, Joschka (1999b) Speech at the European Parliament, Strasbourg, 21 July.
- Grabbe, Heather and Hughes, Kirty (1998) *Enlarging the EU Eastwards*. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.
- Hurd, Douglas and Kinkel, Klaus (1994) 'Welcome to our Eastern Cousins', *The Times*, 26 April 1994 (German version in *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 26 April 1994).
- Hyde-Price, Adrian (2001) 'Beware the Jabberwock!: Security Studies in the Twenty-First Century', in H. Gärtner, A. Hyde-Price and E. Reiter, *Europe's New Security*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Knudsen, Olav, F. (2001) 'Post-Copenhagen Security Studies: Desecuritizing Securitization', *Security Dialogue* 32(3): 355–68.
- Kramer, Heinz (1993) 'The European Community's Response to the "New Eastern Europe"', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 31(2): 213–44.
- Kratochwil, Friedrich (1989) *Rules, Norms and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lippert, Barbara (2002) 'EU Enlargement: Comparing US and European Approaches, Interests and Roles', in L. John (ed.) *Whole and Free: NATO, EU and Transatlantic Relations*, pp. 27–47. London: Federal Trust.
- Lippert, Barbara et al. (2001) *British and German Interests in EU Enlargement: Conflict and Cooperation*. London and New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs.
- Major, John (1993) 'Raise Your Eyes, There is a Land Beyond', *The Economist*, 25 September.
- Mayhew, Alan (1998) *Recreating Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Missiroli, Antonio, ed. (2002) *Bigger EU, Wider CFSP, Stronger EDSP?: The View from Central Europe*. Institute for Security Studies, Occasional Papers, 3 April.
- Mitterrand, François (1995) 'Programme of the French Presidency', Speech in the European Parliament, Strasbourg, 17 January.
- Prodi, Romano (1999) Speech at the European Parliament, Brussels, SPEECH/99/130. 13 October. Available at <http://www.europa.eu.int>

- Prodi, Romano (2000) 'Ich bin eine Dieselmachine', *Focus* 31 (January): 262–4.
- Rasmussen, Anders Gogh (2002) Speech in the Centre for European Policy Studies, 3 July.
- Santer, Jacques (1995) Speech to the European Parliament. *Debate of the European Parliament*, 17 January.
- Schimmelfennig, Frank (2001) 'The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union', *International Organization* 55(1): 47–80.
- Schmidt, Vivien (2000) 'Democracy and Discourse in an Integrating Europe and a Globalising World', *European Law Journal* 6(3): 277–300.
- Smith, Karen (1999) *The Making of EU Foreign Policy: The Case of Eastern Europe*. London: Macmillan.
- Solana, Javier (2001) 'Enlargement of the European Union — Opportunity or Threat?' Speech at the Utrecht Theatre, Utrecht. 19 June. Available at <http://ue.eu.int/newsroom>
- Verheugen, Günter (2000) Debates of the European Parliament, 3 October. Available at <http://www.europarl.eu.int>
- Wallace, Helen (2000) 'Policy Process', in Helen Wallace and William Wallace (eds) *Policy-making in the European Union*, 4th edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wallace, William (1996) *Opening the Door: the Enlargement of NATO and the European Union*. London: Centre for European Reform.
- Wæver, Ole (1995) 'Securitization and Desecuritization', in Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed.) *On Security*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Wæver, Ole (1996) 'European Security Identities', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 34(1): 103–32.

ATSUKO HIGASHINO is a lecturer at the University of Birmingham. She has published on European integration in *Annals of the European Union Studies Association*, *Journal of Law, Politics and Society* and *Issues of Diplomacy* (all written in Japanese). Her current research focuses on European security, EU enlargement and theories of European integration.

Address: University of Birmingham, Department of Political Science and International Studies, Edgbaston, Birmingham, UK, B15 2TT.
[email: atsuko@higashino.freereserve.co.uk]